[1] - Bill Somerville researched this incident and had the following notation: "In truth the details concerning the loss of Rizan Maru are obscure, later, in fact on the 29th. Shirasaki arrived back at Otaru, her captain reported some details: He said while his ship was returning from Kashiwabara she searched in the area where Rizan Maru had disappeared, here at 1245 on the 28th., 390 kilometres north of Cape Shiretoko, various items were found floating in the sea. Items such as straw rice bags, lumber, a table, a sofa and so forth. However no survivors or bodies were found.
The above reports led the Japanese to surmise that Rizan Maru was sunk by an enemy submarine and the explosions Kamikaze heard were from an attack on the unfortunate maru. Rizan Maru was a 4850 ton ship, at the time she was carrying the 6th. Aviation Special Signals Unit (twenty-nine men) and six passengers. These together with ship's gunners and crew made a total of 172 men, all killed.
Allied records claim that this ship was the victim of the USS Searaven (SS-196). At about the time mentioned above, Searaven fired four torpedoes at a single target for one claimed hit and a sinking. Earlier this submarine had fired at one of the escorts and one of the other merchant ships without success."
[2] - This inference follows simply from the steaming time does not fit Odomari.
[3] - Nokaze's CO, LtCdr Ebihara, was among them and recovered. However, he was killed on 29 March 1945 when the ship aboard transporting to Japan was sunk. (This likely was a member of convoy HI-88J)
[4] - Though based on reminisces of Noriaki Ishimaru "The end of the sea hero: Haguro disappeared off the coast of Penang" there is little reason to doubt this. Mine warnings actually temporarily closing Johore and even Singapore Straits to traffic till could be swept were common in 1945. Since Haguro was directed at 1317 on 23 March to "effect hull repairs and enter dock on--" even as a fragment the message tends to confirm something happened a little earlier which would jibe well with a 20 March mining incident.
[5] - The ULTRA intercept this is based on has its last part unfortunately unreadable but apparently some damage done. It seems scarcely credible that a torpedo hit on Ashigara could have gone unreported in the post war record, but all indications are that the heavy cruiser suffered some kind of mishap that took out her port outboard engine room and or shaft became unusable from this mission forward. If a submarine knocked out her port forward engine room at 1140 on 23 April it would explain much of what follows until her loss. It is known she operated less one of her port engines thereafter, but the damage is usually ascribed to hitting a reef or a wreck when drydocked on 29 April. This small mystery is still under investigation. Locating a War Diary of the 10th Area Fleet would like solve it.
[6] - Sometimes written as `SHO' which is easily confused with SHO-GO of Leyte Gulf battles the previous year, contemporary documents spell it out with two `oos' and explain that `Shoo' stands for Shoonan, i.e., Shonan, Singapore. The withdraw of garrisons back to Singapore.
[7] - Recollections of Captain Kasuga Hitoshi. Also, Senshi Sosho Vol. 54.
[8] - Post-war it was revealed that Haguro's Navigator LtCdr Ota Kazumuchi [59], being recently assigned to the cruiser and unfamiliar with these waters, was very concerned about failing to sight at night the floating bouy that marked the edge of the danger zone and running into the Japanese minefield south of One Fathom Bank. XO Capt. Ono Itaru [50] agreed it was dangerous. The decision was made to slow and these speed changes were implemented to arrive at the minefields as first light was breaking, about 0530 Tokyo time. This was done even though it was realized this might allow encounter with the enemy about 0200. But Kamikaze was not radioed or blinkered any explanation at the time and (reasonably) drew an optimistc but incorrect conclusion as to the meaning of the speed reductions.
[9] - Post-war Captain Kasuga as he recalled it related that he reluctantly and independently made the decision to part company at just this time when alongside. It appears he did not receive the detachment order from ComCrudiv 5 - which was sent - and would have put his mind more at rest.
[10] - These rescued figures are as sent by message. They differ slightly from the likely more accurate ones finalized after the war.
[11] - A `Phase 2' of SHOO (AKIRAKA) operation to withdraw forces in the Andamans was in fact launched in early June. On 7 June the very same members of Force #2 that had managed almost miraculously to complete their assignment when HAGURO was sunk were tasked with another such foray. Under the command of the Commanding officer of the Subchaser 57 the KUROSHIO MARU No.2 and SC-57 were tasked with trying to get to Port Blair once more.
They departed 8 June and at 2000 were 205 degrees 85 miles from Muka Cape (5-28'N, 100-10'E) . They were due at Port Blair at 1500 13 June but their luck ran out the day before when encountered a British surface force at 0820 12 June and by 0855 both had been sunk. Torpedo boats of 9th Base Force at Sabang carried out rescue operations after the British withdrew.
On 15 June 1140am a frustrated Fukudome advised Tokyo that as important as the Andamans evacuation was, "it is obvious from the two attempts at SHOO Operations that success will not be achieved by use of sailing vessels. Request German submarines be assigned to this Fleet for this purpose." [Its worth noting the two former-U-boats in Johore Strait - I-501 and I-502 were indeed operational and loaded with 16 torpedoes each when the war ended. It is unclear if they did make such a run to the Andamans at the last minute comparable to Kamikaze's to Ha Tien.]
[12] - There is some uncertainty here. Most accounts mention rescue of about 400 troops, but the message of that day from Captain Miura is listing only those rescued, and gives a figure of 1,200. The 400 may be a conflation of what Kamikaze takes aboard but this matter is still under research.
[13] - This "landing" was by USS Hawkbill (SS-366) recorded as having on August 10th destroyed with gunfire a radio station on Jemaja Island, position 02-55N 105-40 E. On June 11th a landing party composed Australians and crew than went and burned a gas dump, and rescued Indian POW in Terampah Harbor.[The submarine done the same to Tambelan Island radio station on 9 August].