So, you ask, just who were these guys who ran rampant in the Pacific for the better part of a year? Well, here they are: the men who made Nihon Kaigun the most feared naval force in the Pacific, for a time anyway. For the sake of ease I will use Western format names: family name last, given name first.

 

Isoroku Yamamoto

Mastermind of the Pearl Harbor attack, and leader of Combined Fleet until 1943, his plane was shot down over Bougainville on April 18, 1943 by American P-38 aircraft. I personally think Yamamoto was a gifted individual, but also a bit over-rated. His needlessly complex operational scheme at the Battle of Midway dispersed his forces in the face of a still-dangerous foe, and directly led to the disaster there. Further, in the subsequent battles around the Solomons he was seemingly unable to capitalize on the weaknesses of the U.S. carrier forces opposing him, and was also unwilling (until it was too late) to risk sending the heavy surface units of the Combined Fleet down there to kick some butt. This unwillingness, to me, belies Yamamoto's underlying belief that battleships still were the ultimate arm of decision, and should therefore be hoarded in hopes of participating in a Decisive Battle.

Guest commentary by C. Peter Chen of World War II Database: Yamamoto was among the first Japanese officers to recognize aviation as the "next big thing" in naval warfare; in fact, he played a role in the humble beginning of the Japanese Navy's air arm as the head of the Aeronautics Department and as commanding officer of the First Carrier Division. His concept of using air power to destroy the United States' ability to wage war in the Pacific Ocean was the foremost example of his faith in this relatively new technology. Ironically enough, his endless pursuit of a Mahanian decisive battle with the surface fleet was his ultimate short-coming. His early support of the Japanese naval air arm and the early successes in the Pacific War meant that he should be at least partially responsibility for Japan's inability to manufacture enough aircraft and train enough pilots to replace casualties.
 

Chuichi Nagumo

Every IJN fan's favorite whipping-boy admiral, and hey, why should I be any different? Gruff, conservative, not overly-imaginative, and at his core profoundly suspicious of the potency of carrier-based airpower, Nagumo was (ironically enough) placed in charge of the most powerful naval air armada of the first half of the war: Kido Butai, Japan's carrier strike force. He was in charge of executing Yamamoto's plan for a Pearl Harbor attack, which was also ironic, because he and Yamamoto got along very poorly, and Nagumo didn't believe in Yamamoto's plan at all. The result; a spectacular, but somewhat superficial victory in Hawaii, wherein the US heavy surface units were largely destroyed or disabled, but escort vessels and (much more important) oil tanks farms and repair facilities escaped practically untouched (despite the urging of his staff officers to launch a second attack and destroy them). This, in turn, left the US Navy with both the carrier escorts and the logistical underpinnings necessary to carry on the war.

After Pearl Harbor, Nagumo commanded Kido Butai through its subsequent six-month long reign of terror, during which it roamed the Pacific with seeming invincibility, until it was finally dismembered at the Battle of Midway. Thereafter he went on to lead the Combined Fleet's carrier aviation forces through a series of uninspiring performances around the Solomons, finally being removed from command after the Battle of Santa Cruz, October 25-27, 1942. He died by his own hand during the invasion of Saipan in July, 1944.

Guest commentary by C. Peter Chen of World War II Database: For an officer of the old school, who believed in the ways of the big gun more than aircraft, it was a surprise that he was placed in charge of a carrier group. Sure he was among the hardest working admirals in the navy, but his innate distrust of naval aviation seemed to lead him to certain doom. This was where his leadership and experience came into play. In the first six months of the Pacific War, he racked up the most impressive resume in the history of naval warfare:

  • He had sailed from Kurile Islands to Pearl Harbor, returned to the western portion of the South Pacific, and then sailed into the Indian Ocean.
  • He had destroyed five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, dozens of merchantmen, transports, and various other vessels.
  • He was responsible for destroying hundreds of aircraft from six nations.
  • He brought destruction upon Allied ports, disabling or slowing Allied operations.
  • The damage brought upon Allied forces were at a cost of no more than a few dozen pilots.

Of course, the failure at the Battle of Midway allowed Yamamoto, who had not been a supporter of Nagumo, to remove him from power. After Midway, he held much less important posts and largely faded away from history.
 

Aritomo Goto

I would have liked to have met this guy; he looked like a real character. Admiral Goto participated in several of the major campaigns of the war, being commander of Cruiser Division 6 (Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa). His ships supplied the bulk of the muscle Admiral Mikawa used to such good effect at the Battle of Savo Island. Goto was killed aboard the Aoba during the Battle of Cape Esperance, October 11-12, 1942.
 

Gunichi Mikawa

Victor at the Battle of Savo Island, the worst defeat ever suffered by the United States Navy. With a 'pickup team' of mostly aging cruisers and a lone destroyer, Mikawa sortied down 'The Slot' shortly after the U.S. Marine Corps landed on Guadalcanal. Through a combination of determination, good luck, and lapses in command and control on the part of the Allied naval forces, Mikawa's force achieved total surprise, and quickly sank four Allied heavy cruisers while suffering only minor damage to his own vessels. Unfortunately, he then promptly withdrew from the scene of the fight before destroying the Allied transports anchored in the Sound, for which act he has been endlessly (and in my opinion, unjustly) pilloried by historians on both sides... (send me e-mail if you want to argue the point).
 

Tamon Yamaguchi

Perhaps Japan's most gifted carrier admiral, Yamaguchi was astute, aggressive, and ambitious. Unfortunately for Japan's war effort, he was also heavily steeped in the Bushido Code, which meant that he was pretty much obligated to do away with himself after having lost his carrier Hiryu during the closing stages of the Battle of Midway. So it goes.

Guest commentary by C. Peter Chen of World War II Database: Near the end of the Battle of Midway, he told pilot Tomonaga, who was about to go on an attack in which he did not expect to return, "I will gladly follow you". That summed up his deep belief in that he must succeed, or would die trying. Instead of taking the chance to escape with Hiryu, thus potentially saving a fleet carrier to fight another day, he steered Hiryu into more dangerous waters for a final attack that was nearly impossible to win. Before Midway, he was considered capable, brave, and a possible successor to Yamamoto; after this demonstration of stubborness, it showed that he might not had been a good choice as Yamamoto's successor, after all.
 

Jisaburo Ozawa

Commander of Japan's carrier forces from November 1942 through the remainder of the war. Ozawa, who's nickname was 'The Gargoyle', was commonly regarded as one of the three ugliest admirals in the Navy. He also happened to be a fine commander, compassionate towards his men, and unselfish in his operational planning. It was his ill fate to be the commander of a fleet that was doomed, through a combination of logistical, technological, and training inferiorities, to lose an uninterrupted series of battles to the ever-expanding American naval forces. His fleet ended its combat career off of the Phillipines as nothing more than a bait force, flight decks empty for lack of planes and pilots. Nevertheless, Ozawa played his role intelligently and professionally until the end.

Guest commentary by C. Peter Chen of World War II Database: After the war, US Navy officers who interrogated him commented that he was "an officer of impressive personality, dignified presence, and thoughtful habit of mind. While his memory for fine detail was not always precise his opinions were considered of the highest value." The interrogation also reflected his opinion against starting a war against the United States back in 1941.
 

Tameichi Hara

Captain of destroyer Amatsukaze at the beginning of the war, and squadron commander aboardShigure during much of the fighting in the Solomons. He survived several very close scrapes in the Solomons, including being the lone destroyer to survive the fiasco off of Vella LaVella on August 6, 1943, where three of four Japanese ships involved (Hagikaze, Arashi, and Kawakaze) were all ambushed and sunk within the space of a few minutes in the Battle of Kula Gulf. By the end of the war he had become skipper of Yahagi, which accompanied (and was sunk along with) Yamato on her final sortie, although Hara again survived. Hara exemplified the best in Japanese surface commanders; highly skilled (particularly in torpedo warfare and night fighting), hard driving, and aggressive. He was also bitterly critical of the Japanese Navy's handling of the war.
 

Raizo Tanaka

This guy was a bonafide genius, probably one of the finest squadron commanders of the entire war to serve on either side. He routinely defeated superior Allied forces in the Solomons, or escaped with the bulk of his forces from traps that should have meant his annihilation, the Battle of Tassafaronga, November 30, 1942, being a prime example. His primary working assets were often no more inspiring than a handful of overloaded, overworked destroyer transports. Fortunately for the U.S., he was removed from surface command shortly after the final evacuation from Guadalcanal, presumably a casualty of the Navy's finger-pointing as to who was to blame for the debacle.